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INTRODUCTION
The status of human rights in the Arab states' of the Middle East is a subject as complex as it is controversial. Human rights in these countries are affected not only by Isiam but also by political and economic relations with the West, the rise of pan-Arabism, the Palestinian self-determination struggle, and other factors. Any evaluation of human rights will also be influenced by the standard applied, whether universal, comparative, or specific to the country or region under examination. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and who do not accept these obligations have no rights, and any claims of freedom that they make upon society lack justification."
The Quran has numerous references to duties (farud), but the few references to rights (huquq) are better translated as "claims" and have particular and specialized application to penal law. The only rights that are "inalienable" in the Western, natural rights sense, are those belonging to Allah and to the state, Allah's servant.
But the individual's lack of rights is not seen by Islam in a negative light. This condition reflects the rejection of individualism in favor of communalism. The individual is placed in the context of the community of believers, which itself has rights as a whole unit. According to Mohammed Talbi, Islam maintains that "humans are not created for solitariness and impervious individuality. They are created for community, relationship and dialogue."'2 Thus, the Muslim is not the autonomous individual of Western philosophy but "one who submits" (muslim) completely to God.
Parallel to the individual's submission to God-and more problematic from the standpoint of human rights-is the individual's divinely ordained obligation of obedience to government. According to Islamic legal scholar Cherif Bassiouni:
Unlike western philosophical and political perceptions of the separability of the individual and the state, Islamic social concepts do not make such a distinction. The individual does not stand in any adversary position vis a vis the state but is an integral part thereof. The consequence of this relationship ... is that there is no apparent need to delineate individual rights in contraposition to the state. 13 Some scholars claim that obedience to state authorities is due, however, only when they are acting in accordance with Shari'a. ' Malik cites stories about Omar, the second caliph, and Ali, the fourth, to demonstrate the right to free expression. However, speech is subject to the condition that "this right is to be exercised for righteousness of all [so] we may call it the common good"'8--rather a significant restraint. Moreover, dissenting views can be punished in the caliph's discretion, even treated as apostasy, which is punishable by death. In the view of the exiled Sudanese Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, such sanctions "dampen freedom of speech and create a sense of intellectual and political impotence."'9
ii. Economic Rights. Islam does not recognize the right of private ownership, only a "right of use," since God owns all. But Islam emphasizes the obligation of the state to provide sufficient levels of food, clothing, and housing. The poor must not be required to beg. Thus, the public treasury 15 iii. Criminal Defense Rights. Islamic law provides for penalties not to promote rehabilitation of the criminal but as a retaliation (qisas), either by financial extraction or bodily mutilation. However, punishment (hudud) is supposed to be proportional to the harm wrongfully inflicted. Thus, "retaliation for bodily harm is restricted to those cases in which equality can be assured." Mutilation punishments are on the decline, except in Saudi Arabia and possibly Iran, where they are still ordered frequently.21 Islam also recognizes discretionary penalties for purposes of deterrence (ta'zir), a function espoused more frequently in the West as rehabilitation theories wane in popularity.
iv. Sexual Equality. Probably the most celebrated inequality under traditional Islamic law is the unequal treatment of women, who are considered the wards of men. Women are legally disqualified from holding general political or judicial office, and within the family they lack the capacity to initiate a marriage contract or obtain a unilateral divorce. By law their inheritance of property is usually about half the share of a male with the same degree of relationship to the deceased. Husbands have the right to chastise their wives for "disobedience," including by "light beating." Muslim women can leave the home to seek employment not to fulfill personal ambitions but only when they lack all other means of support. Moreover, a woman's testimony in court is worth only one-half of a man's testimony. The second category of non-Muslims was non-kitaby or those who did not believe in revealed scriptures and were not even entitled to dhimma. The Quran (9:5) ordered, "Slay them wherever you may find them." As discussed below, as a rule of international law, they were presumed to be in a perpetual state of war with Islam. Non-kitabis could be taken into slavery.
Bassiouni acknowledges: "Islamic traditional practice indicates a definite preferential treatment and higher status for the Muslim religion in the Muslim state governed by the Islamic majority. This does not, however, allow the imposition of any undue restriction on non-Muslims or interference with their religious freedoms and practices."26 Perhaps because of that preference, it is the former Muslim who is treated most harshly. While there is limited freedom for non-Muslims, there is no freedom to become a non-Muslim. The tradition, "he who changes his religion, must be killed," is often attributed to the Prophet, but was not invoked by him during his lifetime.27 Although the death penalty for apostasy is usually suspended today, the Salman Rushdie case notwithstanding, the traditional rule does not reflect a problem concerning the issue of free choice and coercion in Islam. The statement in the Quran (2:256), "There should be no compulsion in religion," must certainly be qualified. Moreover, other verses on apostasy implicitly throw into question the purported tolerance of non-Muslims, even kitabis. "If anyone desires a religion other than Islam, never will it be accepted of him; and in the hereafter he will be among the losers" (3:85). With the worldview that Islam is the final and ideal religion, it was inconceivable that anyone should legitimately have or desire another religion.
Historical Context
Islamic concepts of human rights, to be judged fairly, must be seen in the context of pre-Islamic mores and the prevailing Roman and Persian laws of the period. Islam rejected the then-common infanticide and blood feuds. were "pledges by one party to the other, rather than contracts between equals," having "the character of constitutional guarantees to the people of the annexed country rather than agreement between 'independent' countries."35 Hostages were taken as collateral. If the treaty was violated by the Muslims, the hostages were returned; if the other side broke the truce, they were kept. Two other treaty forms were recognized: aman, a pledge of safe-conduct on Muslim territory for one year, without having to pay jizya; and the permanent agreement with dhimmis, which could be described as a charter of rights and duties. Although the dhimmis were not treated as equals of Muslims, they were treated as individuals rather than as subjects of a foreign state. As will be argued below, this model should, at least in the abstract, serve as a salutary precedent for Islamic states in the establishment of internationally recognized human rights norms.
Law in the Middle

Rules of Application
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, that treaties are binding on the parties and must be performed in good faith, has been called "perhaps the most important principle of international law."36 Scholars of Islamic law agree that it is one of the fundamental principles of siyar:
There stands in the background of all Islamic teachings relating to treaties the firm conviction that there exists a basic international norm, binding on Muslims as well as on unbelievers, which bids faithfulness to promises, and through which alone legal international relations between states become possible at all.37
It can be traced back to the Quran (9:4), which made strict compliance with contractual undertakings a religious duty: "Oh ye who believe, fulfil your undertakings." The rule al-shart amlak ("The stipulation prevails"), or al Muslimun 'ala shurutihim ("the Muslims are bound by their stipulations"), applied even to treaties with non-Muslims, which were to prevail over conflicting duties of mutual help among believers.38 As Joseph Schacht has noted, the restriction imposed by Shari'a on liberty of contract, its limit on the scope The issue of how conflicts between international and national law are to be resolved was traditionally never a problem for Islamic law, because siyar was a law of the conqueror. It did not allow for an Islamic state's entering into international agreements as the conquered or as an equal with other mutually consenting states. The notion of conflicting standards was inconceivable because the only standards were Islamic. But just as history forced Islam to evolve the dar al-sulh, the abode of peace, and the reality of coexistence led to the tacit acceptance of territorial limitations between states, the desire of Islamic states to participate in the modern community of nations will require the development of rules to reconcile conflicting international and domestic legal norms. As will be seen, "modernization" need not mean "Westernization," but further accommodations to the modern world will indeed be necessary. One current frontier of that conflict-international human rights law and its attempts toward universal standardswill be explored in the next part of this study. the purposes and objectives of a given society, subject to the due process of law."46
The following examination of the specific response of Islamic states to the major international human rights agreements will make the implications of this proviso clearer.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
According to Khadduri As early as 1948, Saudi delegates to the United Nations opposed provisions on women's rights, arguing that marriage, an area in which "Islamic law was explicit on the smallest details," ought not to be burdened by international requirements that wives be of full age and have equal rights. These concepts were said to reflect Western biases and to ignore the internal safeguards of Islam, which guarantee women property, inheritance, and compensation following divorce.64 Even the Pakistani delegate, prior to the The following sections describe modern constitutional and statutory provisions-some consciously promulgated in reference to international treaties, some adopted years before passage of the agreements--in the substantive areas already surveyed as relevant to the traditional Islamic concept of human rights. 
Conventions on Women The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Sexual Equality
